










WORKING PAPER 2004:2 
     
The Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) is a research insti-
tute under the Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communica-
tions, situated in Uppsala. IFAU’s objective is to promote, support and carry 
out: evaluations of the effects of labour market policies, studies of the function-
ing of the labour market and evaluations of the labour market effects of meas-
ures within the educational system. Besides research, IFAU also works on: 
spreading knowledge about the activities of the institute through publications, 
seminars, courses, workshops and conferences; creating a library of Swedish 
evaluational studies; influencing the collection of data and making data easily 
available to researchers all over the country. 
 
IFAU also provides funding for research projects within its areas of interest. 
There are two fixed dates for applications every year: April 1 and November 1. 
Since the researchers at IFAU are mainly economists, researchers from other 
disciplines are encouraged to apply for funding. 
 
IFAU is run by a Director-General. The authority has a traditional board, con-
sisting of a chairman, the Director-General and eight other members. The tasks 
of the board are, among other things, to make decisions about external grants 
and give its views on the activities at IFAU. A reference group including repre-
sentatives for employers and employees as well as the ministries and authori-
ties concerned is also connected to the institute. 
 
Postal address: P.O. Box 513, 751 20 Uppsala 
Visiting address: Kyrkogårdsgatan 6, Uppsala 
Phone: +46 18 471 70 70 





Papers published in the Working Paper Series should, according to the IFAU policy, 
have been discussed at seminars held at IFAU and at least one other academic forum, 
and have been read by one external and one internal referee. They need not, however, 
have undergone the standard scrutiny for publication in a scientific journal. The pur-
pose of the Working Paper Series is to provide a factual basis for public policy and the 
public policy discussion. 
 
 
ISSN 1651-1166 IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  1 






a and Jonas Lagerström
b 
 
March 1, 2004 
Abstract 
We use the Swedish Job Applicant Database to empirically investigate whether 
being unemployed per se reduces the probability to get contacted by a firm.  
This database contains personal characteristics and preferences over the type of 
job the applicant wants to find.  The data is submitted both by employed and 
unemployed workers over the Internet by the applicants themselves.  This 
means that we have access to exactly the same information as firms have when 
they choose whom to contact.  Our results show that an unemployed applicant 
faces a lower probability to get contacted by a firm than an otherwise identical 
employed applicant, thus supporting the claim that firms view employment 
status as an important signal for productivity. 
 
Keywords: Employed and unemployed job seekers, discrimination. 
JEL classification: J64, J71. 
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1 Introduction 
In continental Europe, unemployment started to rise in the late seventies and it 
has since remained very high.  In Sweden high unemployment became a 
problem during the severe economic crisis of the 1990s.  The Swedish 
unemployment rate quickly reached a very high level and it then took several 
years before it started to fall back to more normal levels.  Irrespective of what 
economic disturbances that caused the initial rise in unemployment, the 
question why the adjustment back to equilibrium has taken so long must be 
explained before we can claim to understand the dynamics of unemployment. 
A number of explanations for the persistence of unemployment have been 
proposed.
1  These explanations are often based on the idea that some factor in 
the wage formation process prevents wages from falling, thereby, keeping the 
unemployment rate high.  One such explanation starts by noting that a firm 
often has a choice between hiring employed and unemployed applicants.  If 
firms perceive employed applicants as more attractive to hire than unemployed 
applicants, wages will not fall despite the high unemployment rate.  Instead, 
competition among firms over already employed workers will keep wages 
high.   
In principle, there are two reasons why unemployment might be perceived 
as a negative worker characteristic.  The first explanation is based on a 
selection argument.  It assumes that the most unproductive workers in the 
economy are concentrated to the pool of unemployed workers, e.g. because 
firms generally lay off their least productive workers in bad times.  If firms 
cannot distinguish these workers from other fully productive unemployed 
workers, unemployment becomes a signal of low productivity.
2  Firms might 
thus find it optimal to avoid hiring unemployed workers.  The second expla-
nation is based on duration effects.  It assumes that workers lose human capital, 
e.g. productive or social skills, during unemployment.  If firms perceive that 
many unemployed workers have suffered such a loss of skills, it might be 
optimal to avoid hiring them, especially if this is combined with an inability 
among firms to identify which workers that have lost skills.  Both of these 
                                                      
1 See, for example, the discussion in Bean (1994). 
2 The term signal is used throughout the paper and should be interpreted in a wide sense.   
Employment status is viewed as a signal of productivity by firms but obviously differs from the 
more narrow use of the word signal as something that the sender chooses.  IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  4 
stories share the idea that unemployment signals low productivity and should 
be important in labor markets where firms have an imperfect ability to observe 
the productive abilities of their applicants.  If this is a reasonable assumption 
for real world labor markets, we might expect such signals to significantly 
affect the hiring strategies used by firms.  However, two factors could mitigate 
these effects; unemployed workers might be able to start working on a new job 
sooner and/or accept a lower initial wage. 
It can be shown, that if firms discriminate against unemployed workers in 
hiring this can have profound effects for the aggregate economy.  Eriksson and 
Gottfries (2003) analyze the macroeconomic implications of such behavior.
3  It 
is shown that this, in the aggregate, will lead to higher equilibrium unemploy-
ment and a slower adjustment back to equilibrium after a negative shock to the 
economy.  The explanation for these effects is that since firms use the wage to 
control turnover they will be reluctant to lower it rapidly fearing a costly rise in 
turnover.  Numerical simulations indicate that the effects are substantial and 
have the potential to explain the observed persistence of unemployment.   
However, to be certain that such statistical discrimination is a feature 
characterizing European labor markets we have to verify it empirically.  The 
purpose of this paper is, therefore, to empirically investigate whether an 
unemployed applicant has a lower probability to find a job than an otherwise 
identical employed applicant.   
Anyone wishing to investigate how employment status affects an appli-
cant’s chance to get a job faces a number of difficulties.  First, data is needed 
about the search behavior and search outcomes for both employed and 
unemployed job applicants.  This data must include information about the 
search intensity for both groups, since it is possible that there are systematic 
differences between them.  However, such data is often difficult to obtain 
because on-the-job search and job-to-job switches are not recorded in official 
registers.  Second, data about all other relevant characteristics of the searchers 
are needed to isolate the effect from employment status from other factors that 
employers take into account when they make hiring decisions.  The last 
complication is often encountered in studies of discrimination and is very 
                                                      
3 In Eriksson and Gottfries (2003), it is taken as a starting point that employers prefer to hire 
employed applicants.  In Eriksson (2002) a microeconomic explanation for such behavior is 
explored. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  5 
difficult to solve because it is rare for the researcher to have access to all the 
information the firms use when they make their hiring decisions. 
This paper uses data from the Applicant Database (Sökandebanken), which 
is kept by the Swedish Employment Office (AMS).  All workers, both 
employed and unemployed, looking for a new job are invited to submit details 
about their education, work experience, other skills as well as details about the 
type of jobs they want to find.
4  Employers can then search in this database for 
applicants that they find interesting and contact them for interviews etc.  All 
such contacts are registered.  The data covers all applicants remaining as active 
searchers in April 2001 who agreed to participate in this research project.  This 
dataset makes it possible to study how the probability to get contacted by an 
employer, and the number of contacts received, depends on the characteristics 
of the applicants; e.g. their employment status.   
The dataset allows us to overcome many of the above-mentioned problems.  
First, we have data about the search activities of a lot of employed workers; 
almost half of all workers in the sample search on the job.  Second, the search 
intensity is the same for all workers in the database; to search just means to 
submit the required information to the database.  Third, since the employer 
only observes what is in the database, we can be certain that we have records of 
all information that the employer uses when he or she chooses whom to 
contact.  Thus, we do not need to worry that the employer has access to more 
information than we do.  If we include properly defined control variables for all 
other characteristics, we will obtain estimates measuring the effect from being 
unemployed on the chance to get contacted by an employer. 
  One limitation of using this dataset is that we do not know whom the 
employer finally decides to hire.  However, for an applicant to get hired, he or 
she must be contacted by an employer.  Therefore, if we find that the prob-
ability to get contacted by an employer is lower for unemployed workers, this 
will also be strong evidence that the hiring probability is lower for unemployed 
workers.
5 
                                                      
4 This dataset has previously been used in Edin and Lagerström (2002) who study discrimination 
based on gender or ethnicity. 
5 The hiring of a worker often involves several steps.  For example, a firm identifies a few 
candidates in the Applicant Database they find interesting and decides to contact them, these 
workers are asked to send in applications, the firm chooses to interview a couple of these 
workers, and finally hires one of them.  This means that the firm may be: (i) less likely to contact 
unemployed workers, (ii) given that the firm contacts unemployed workers be less likely to 
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We estimate two types of models in the paper.  First, we estimate models for 
the probability to get contacted by an employer.  We insert control variables for 
education, work experience, other skills, regional and occupational dummies as 
well as dummy variables for the current labor market status of the applicant.   
The results of these regressions show that an unemployed worker faces a lower 
probability to get contacted by an employer than an employed applicant.  For 
an otherwise identical searcher, being unemployed reduces the contact 
probability by 3 percentage points.  For the “typical” searcher, this corresponds 
to a decrease in the probability to get contacted from 45 percent to 42 percent; 
i.e. a 7 percent decrease.
6  However, it should also be noted that the relative 
effect from a 3 percentage point drop in the contact probability can be much 
bigger for a low skilled worker searching for unqualified work.  Second, we 
estimate models for the number of contacts received by the applicants using the 
same control variables.  The results of the regressions show that an un-
employed worker gets around 0.13 fewer contacts over the sample period than 
an employed worker.  For the “typical” searcher, this corresponds to a decrease 
in the number of contacts received from 1.10 to 0.97; i.e. a 12 percent decrease.  
All results are statistically significant at conventional levels and appear stable 
over different specifications and estimation methods. 
Both of these results indicate that firms prefer to contact employed appli-
cants rather than unemployed applicants even when we control for a number of 
other observable differences.  Thus, it seems to be the case that unemployment 
per se is seen as a signal of negative unobservable characteristics.  These 
results give support to the theoretical claims in Eriksson and Gottfries (2003) 
and Eriksson (2002).  
Due to the difficulties that arise when one tries to identify labor market 
discrimination based on employment status, there exist few related studies that 
use standard econometric techniques.  Instead, most of the existing literature 
uses surveys or interviews.  Examples using Swedish data are Agell and 
                                                      
choose to interview unemployed workers and (iii) given that the firm chooses to interview 
unemployed workers be less likely to hire them.  Thus, total discrimination may be a product of 
these three components.  However, it can also be the case that it does not matter, or even is an 
advantage, to be unemployed in the later stages of the hiring process for the reasons discussed 
above. 
6 The “typical” searcher is a 26-35 year old Swedish man with secondary education and at least 
five years labor market experience who has a driving license, good computer skills, good 
language skills in Swedish and English and that searches for technical work (Amsyk 3) in 
Stockholm. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  7 
Bennmarker (2002), Agell and Lundborg (2003), Klingvall (1998) and 
Behrentz and Delander (1996).  All of these studies find evidence in favor of 
the view that some firms view unemployment as a negative characteristic.   
Similar results for other countries can be found in Bewley (1999) for the US 
and Atkinson, Giles and Meager (1996) for the UK.  However, even though 
these studies support the view that labor market status is used as a hiring 
criterion, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the relative probability to find 
employment from such studies.  One might also question whether employers 
that do use unemployment as a hiring criterion are willing to admit to that in an 
interview or a survey.  Such bias might result in an underestimation of the true 
extent of discrimination.  Given these limitations of survey-based data, it is 
clearly advantageous to use data on what employers actually do rather than 
what they claim they do.  
There are a few related econometric studies.  An example is Blau and 
Robins (1990).  They use data from the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project 
(EOPP), a US dataset collected in 1979-80.  They find that unemployed 
searchers do get fewer job offers than employed searchers even after con-
trolling for other differences.  Belzil (1996) finds similar results using 
Canadian data.
7  However, in none of these studies can the authors claim that 
they have access to all the information that firms use when choosing whom to 
hire.  Thus in those studies, it is difficult to know if it is unemployment per se 
or some other information obtained by firms in job interviews etc., 
unobservable to the researcher, that determines whom the firm hires.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a dis-
cussion about which factors we expect should affect the hiring decisions of 
firms.  In Section 3 we present the dataset used in the estimation and in Section 
4 we define the variables, discuss the estimation strategy and present the 




                                                      
7 There exist a few more studies but they tend to focus on youths.  Andrews et al (2001) find that 
employed search is slightly more effective for UK youths aged 15-18.  In contrast, Holzer (1987) 
finds that unemployed search is more effective using a sample of US youths.  Belzil (1996) finds 
that mature workers are more likely to be stigmatized by unemployment than youths. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  8 
2  A theoretical framework 
Before going into the empirical analysis, it is useful to briefly consider how we 
would expect an employer, which must choose whom to hire from a pile of 
applications, to behave; i.e. which factors should influence whom the firm 
chooses to contact.  The discussion in this section is very informal and its sole 
purpose is to guide us in the empirical analysis below.  A formal analysis of 
hiring under uncertainty can be found in Eriksson (2002).  
A crucial factor that determines whom the employer considers as hirable is 
the information set he or she has available when choosing whom to contact.  If 
the information available to the employer were totally illuminating about the 
abilities of all the applicants, this would be easy.  However, this is highly 
unlikely since there are a lot of factors that determine the productivity of a 
worker.  Therefore, the employer has to make a decision in a situation 
characterized by imperfect information.  In such a situation, there are 
essentially two types of factors that we expect will affect whom the employer 
decides to contact.  First, some observable factors can affect the productive 
abilities of the applicants directly.  Examples of such factors are education, 
work experience, other skills etc.  Second, other factors are important only as 
signals for unobservable factors that in turn may affect the productivity of the 
applicants.  Examples of signals are employment status, gender and ethnicity.
8  
Examples of unobservable factors are ability to cooperate, motivation and other 
social skills.   
Figure 1 illustrates how different types of information should affect the 
contact decision.  The lines represent real or perceived correlations.  From 
Figure 1 it is clear that in the empirical analysis below we should include 
variables for all observable productive factors and for all signals that employers 




                                                      
8 Factors such as education and experience also might be viewed as signals for unobservable 
characteristics.  However, there is a fundamental difference between these factors and factors 
like employment status.  Employment status is only meaningful as a screening criterion if the 
employer believes it is correlated with some other factor that do affect productivity, while 
education and experience are meaningful as screening criterions by directly affecting 
productivity. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  9 
Figure 1.  Factors that affect the contact decision of the firm 
 
Observable skills 
(Education, work experience etc.) 
  
      
                                       Perceived productivity 
          
Unobservable skills  Signals 
(Social skills, ( Employment status, 




This paper uses data from the Applicant Database (Sökandebanken), which is 
kept by the Swedish Employment Office (AMS) since the fall of 1997.  All 
workers, both employed and unemployed, that want to find a new job are 
invited to submit their personal details to the database.  This can be done either 
from home via the Internet or at the Employment Office.  The applicant is 
required to submit details about education, work experience, language skills 
and a personal letter as well as information about which type of job he or she is 
interested in.
9 Employers that are registered with the Employment Office can 
                                                      
9 The information is submitted using specially constructed forms that must be filled out by the 
applicants.  This means that there are no missing values.  In the personal letter, the applicant is 
free to write whatever he or she wants.  This means that it can contain both a duplication of 
information that also has been filled out in the other forms and other kinds of personal 
information.  It is difficult for us to know how much this information affects employers in their 
contact decisions.  We do not try to grade the quality of the personal letters because such a 
measure would be highly subjective.  However, it should be kept in mind that employers might 
use the quality of the personal letter as a signal for unobservable characteristics.  Another 
peculiarity of the data set is that people are allowed to hide personal information like name and 
gender.  This generates information that can be used to study discrimination based on gender or 
ethnicity (see Edin and Lagerström (2002)).  This feature of the data is not used in this paper and 
does not in any way affect our results. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  10
use the database to locate workers they find interesting and contact them for 
interviews etc.  Most such contacts are registered in the database.
10 
In this section we discuss the data used in the empirical investigation.  We 
describe how the data was obtained, give summary statistics and discuss 
selection issues. 
 
3.1  The characteristics of the sample 
In the spring of 2001, the Applicant Database contained approximately 50,000 
individuals with a monthly inflow of around 11,000 new applicants.  All 
applicants that logged into the system between March 1 and March 12, 2001 
were asked if they wanted to participate in a research study investigating the 
recruitment behavior of firms.
11  Around 50 percent of those asked agreed, 
giving us a sample of 8,666 individuals.  Because we did not want to include 
youths in secondary school in the sample we excluded all individuals aged 
below 20.
12  That gives us the sample used in this study consisting of 8,043 
individuals.
13  These people have been in the database for an average time of 
approximately 35 weeks.  Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics about the 







                                                      
10 It is possible that some employers contact applicants using other methods that do not get 
recorded, e.g. if a worker includes a phone number in the personal letter.  However, according to 
the Employment Office most contacts are made within the system. 
11 This was required by the Employment Office.  The data used were collected for use in Edin 
and Lagerström (2002).  The system registers if and when the applicants log into the system.  
Since all workers included in our empirical investigation logged in during this time, only active 
searchers should be included in the sample.   
12 Most of the applicants aged below 20 look for work during the summer break or temporary 
work on school holidays etc.  Therefore, it seems natural to exclude them in our empirical 
investigation. 
13 It should be noted that our sample is a stock-flow sample; i.e. our sample includes both new 
applicants that registered their details during the period 1-12 March and applicants that logged 
into their already existing accounts in that time period.  Stock-flow sampling sometimes can 
cause problems.  However, given that we insert properly defined control variables for all factors 
that affect the contact probability it should not affect our results. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  11 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics about the characteristics of the applicants and 
the jobs they want to find (in fractions) 
 All  Employed  Unemployed 
 
Number of applicants 
 




In other training 
On parental leave  
 







Some (less than 5 years) 







Good computer skills 
Good language skills - Swedish 
Good language skills - English 

























































































































































































Legislators, senior officials and 
managers (Amsyk 1) 
Professionals  
(Amsyk 2) 




Service workers and shop sales workers 
(Amsyk 5) 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 
(Amsyk 6) 
Craft and related trades workers 
(Amsyk 7) 
Plant and machine operators and 

































































































































Note: Our measure of labor market experience only includes work in those occupations the 
worker wants to find a job.  This explains why some of those who are employed are classified as 
having no work experience. G-F-S denotes language skills in German, French or Spanish.  The 
column labelled all includes all searchers including students etc.  It is possible for the workers to 
search for jobs in several regions and/or occupations.  This explains why the fractions do not sum 
to one.   
 IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  13 
From Table 1 there are several things worth noting.  First, the people in the 
sample tend to be quite young and well educated.  The average age is just 
around 34 years and 44 percent have a university degree.  Moreover, many of 
the applicants have a lot of other potentially useful skills.  Second, there are 
almost as many women as men in the database and it includes a non-negligible 
number of workers with foreign names.
14  Third, we have more employed than 
unemployed people in the sample.  This is obviously one of the most attractive 
features of the data set for the purpose of studying competition between 
employed and unemployed workers.  Fourth, we see that a substantial fraction 
of the workers seek employment in the areas surrounding the three biggest 
metropolitan areas and that they are quite diversified with respect to the types 
of work they seek. 
Finally, turning to the number of offers received, the 8,043 workers in our 
sample have received 7,179 contacts from employers during their time in the 
database.  Table 2 gives some summary statistics about the fraction receiving at 
least one offer and the number of offers received, both for all workers and for 
the four employment status subgroups.  
 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics about the contacts received divided into 
employment status subgroups 
Employment status  Fraction receiving at least 
one contact 

















Table 3 presents the distribution of the number of contacts received for all 




                                                      
14 The Applicant Database does not contain information about the ethnical origin of people.  
However, since employers often easily can see the name of the applicant from the information 
submitted, we might expect some employers to use this as a basis for discrimination.  Therefore, 
all workers in the Applicant Database agreeing to participate in the study were asked whether 
they believed other people perceived their name as foreign. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  14
Table 3.  Descriptive statistics about the distribution of contacts received 
divided into employment status subgroups, percent 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  >9 
All  65.9  17.4  6.7 3.1 2.0 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.5 1.1 
Unemployed  71.9  15.2  5.4 2.3 1.8 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.5 
Employed  59.4  19.6  8.2 3.8 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.4 0.6 2.0 
 
From Tables 2 and 3 we see that employed workers receive many more 
contacts than workers in any of the other states.  An employed worker receives, 
on average, almost twice as many contacts as an unemployed worker.   
Obviously, we cannot conclude from these tables that it is unemployment in 
itself that leads to this outcome, since the groups differ systematically in a 
number of other ways as well.  To get an estimate of the extent of discrimi-
nation, we need to control for all these other differences; which is what we do 
in the next section.  However, the shear size of the differences in Table 2 is 
striking.  We also see that people currently participating in some sort of 
education receive quite few contacts.  This could be due to the fact that 
employers want to find people that can take new jobs directly or some other 
reason. 
 
3.2 Selection  issues 
In our case, we have essentially two types of selection issues to discuss. 
However, it is difficult to know the extent of these potential selection problems. 
  First, for our results to have internal validity for this particular search 
channel, we must ask whether we have successfully controlled for all differ-
ences correlated with employment status.  Even though we have access to 
exactly the same information as the employers, it is not certain that we have 
succeeded in this.  If not, this can be a problem if there are systematic 
differences in those dimensions between those who agreed to participate in the 
study and those who did not.  This may lead us to over- or underestimate the 
true amount of discrimination.  For example, if employers that are looking for 
workers with very rare skills are less likely to view unemployment as a negative 
characteristic than employers that are looking for workers with more common 
skills, our sample might include a higher proportion of the first group and, thus, IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  15 
overestimate the true amount of discrimination.  Unfortunately, we do not have 
access to any data about those workers that did not agree to participate in this 
study. However, we find no significant differences in the effects across regions 
or occupations.  Still, even though it seems unlikely that such factors would 
significantly affect the results, this possibility must be kept in mind when 
interpreting the results. 
  Second, since both workers and firms can choose whether or not to use the 
Applicant Database, we might wonder whether those that do use it differ from 
those that do not.  This issue is important if we want to generalize our results to 
the entire economy, i.e. the external validity.  It can be addressed by comparing 
the characteristics of our data to other data sets.  To get a rough idea about 
whether the unemployed in our data differ from the typical unemployed in 
Sweden, we can compare it to data from the Swedish public employment 
offices.
15  Appendix 1 presents the characteristics of unemployed workers in the 
Applicant Database and Händel. Comparing these two data sets, the most 
striking difference is the high proportion of university graduates in our sample.  
In addition, our workers are younger.  To investigate whether the discrimination 
effect differs across education levels and age groups, we have included 
interaction terms in our regressions.  These effects are all highly insignificant 
and do not improve our model significantly, indicating that our results are valid 
also for the entire economy.  Regarding the employers that use the Applicant 
Database it is unfortunately not possible to compare them to the typical 
employer in Sweden. The reason being that our dataset does not include direct 
information about the employers that use the Applicant Database; we only have 




We want to investigate whether the probability to get contacted by an 
employer, and the number of contacts received, is affected by the current 
employment status of the applicant.  As we have seen from Table 1, employed 
                                                      
15 Another data set to compare our sample with is the dataset used by Carling et al (1996) who 
studies the effects of unemployment benefits.  Compared with that data set the most important 
difference is again the high share of university graduates in our sample.  In addition, our 
applicants are a little older and have more work experience. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  16
and unemployed workers differ systematically in a number of other dimensions 
as well.  Thus, we need to define proper control variables for all these other 
factors; observable productive characteristics, other signals than employment 
status and the requirements of the desired job.  In this section, we define the 
variables, present the econometric specification and discuss the results. 
 
4.1 Variables 
The control variables correspond to those presented in Table 1.  Here, we will 
try to give some intuition for how we have chosen to construct these variables. 
First, we have factors that are directly related to the productivity of the 
applicant.  We expect these factors to both explain much of the variation in 
contact rates between applicants and contain systematic differences between 
employed and unemployed applicants.  As a consequence, we must insert 
proper controls for these characteristics.  The two most important observable 
characteristics that directly affect the productivity of the worker are education 
and labor market experience.  To control for education, we include dummy 
variables for the highest completed level of education; primary, secondary or 
university.  To control for experience, we use dummy variables for three 
lengths of experience; none, some ( 5 0 < < t  years) and long ( 5 ≥  years).
16  
We also use dummy variables for managerial experience, experience of 
telecommuting, research experience, driving skills, good computer skills and 
good language skills in Swedish, English, German, Spanish or French. 
Second, we have factors that employers can use as signals for other un-
observable characteristics.  These include age, gender, ethnicity and 
employment status.  For age, we divide the workers into five groups; 20-25, 26-
35, 36-50, 51- years old.
17  For gender and ethnicity, we use naturally defined 
dummy variables.  For employment status, we divide the applicants into five 
groups; employed, unemployed, university students, in other training and on 
child leave.  We include the last three groups to make sure that those classified 
as employed or unemployed really are just that and not students. 
                                                      
16 It can be argued that the number of years of experience is the relevant variable.  However, we 
only have data on labor market experience in those occupations the searcher wants to find a job. 
17 In principle, we could insert age as a continuous variable.  However, we have chosen not to do 
so because there is hard to find a theoretical argument why for example a 35 year old should be 
judged differently by employers than a 34 year old.  In addition, the results do not change if we 
introduce age as a continuous variable. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  17 
Third, we have to include variables for differences among occupational and 
regional labor markets.  Usually, an employer that uses the Applicant Database 
will only consider a small number of the searchers relevant for the job that he 
or she wants to fill; e.g. if a firm wants to hire a carpenter in Stockholm an 
applicant that searches for work as a nurse in Southern Sweden is irrelevant.  
This means that the employer’s choice will usually be limited to those 
searchers that have stated that they are interested in a particular occupation at a 
particular location.  Thus, the requirements the applicants have about the jobs 
they want to find will affect if they receive contacts or not.
18  We must include 
controls for such effects since it is natural to expect that labor market condi-
tions differ between different occupational groups as well as between different 
regions.  To control for such effects, we use dummy variables for occupation 
and location.  For desired occupation, we use dummy variables based on the 
nine-group classification system used by the Employment Office.  For desired 
location, we use dummy variables for counties. 
Fourth, we need to include controls for the length of time applicants have 
been in the Applicant Database since applicants that have been in the database 
longer, on average, have received more contacts.  Thus, we include a vector of 
the variables time and time squared in the estimation. 
 
 
4.2  The probability to receive a contact 
We estimate a model for the probability that a searcher in the Applicant 
Database receives at least one contact, during his or her time in the database, as 
a function of the variables introduced above.  We use the linear probability 
model (LPM) and estimate it using ordinary least squares.  The empirical 
specification is given by: 
 
ε φ γ δ β φ α + + + + + + = = T X Z S t Y P ' ' ' ' ' ) 1 ( ,        (1) 
 
                                                      
18 Of course, it is possible for firms to ignore such requirements and contact workers anyway.  
However, in most cases we would expect such action to be pointless.  In addition, the personal 
letter can contain other requirements for the desired job.  However, it can be argued that such 
more qualitative factors are more likely to be discussed after a contact has been established rather 
than affecting whom the firm chooses to contact. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  18
where  1 = Y  if a contact is recorded ( 0 = Y  otherwise), t  is the time vector, 
S  denotes the current employment status of the applicant, Z  denotes the 
characteristics of the desired job,  X  denotes the observable productive 
characteristics of the applicant, and T  denotes signals other than employment 
status.  Estimation of the specification in (1) yields the results presented in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  Ordinary least squares estimates of the probability to receive a 
contact 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Note: The reference category is an employed man with a Swedish sounding name having primary 
education, some labor market experience and looking for unskilled work in Stockholm.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  20
In column 4, we see the parameter estimates for the full specification.  The 
results indicate that unemployment is considered as a negative worker 
characteristic.  The probability to get contacted by an employer is approxi-
mately 3 percentage points lower for an unemployed applicant than for an 
employed applicant and this effect is statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  To get a feeling for the size of this effect, we can calculate contact 
probabilities for a “typical” applicant.
19  Such a searcher has a 45 percent 
probability to get contacted if he is employed, and a 42 percent probability to 
get contacted if he is unemployed.  Thus, the contact probability is reduced by 
around 7 percent.  However, it should also be noted that the relative effect from 
a 3 percentage point drop in the contact probability can be much bigger for a 
low skilled worker searching for unqualified work in regions with a depressed 
labor market.
20  These results support the theoretical proposition that firms 
view unemployment as a signal of some unobservable negative worker 
characteristic and, ceteris paribus, prefer to contact an employed applicant 
rather than an unemployed applicant. 
Several other things are worth noting.  First, searchers currently enrolled in 
university education also face a lower probability than employed searchers to 
get contacted by an employer.  This might reflect the fact that firms want 
workers that are available for work directly or some other reason.  Second, 
education and labor market experience have the expected signs.  A higher level 
of completed education, or more labor market experience, has a clear positive 
effect on the probability to get contacted.  Third, we see that other applicant 
characteristics functioning as signals, like age and gender, also have quite 
strong effects.  Women and older workers face a significantly lower probability 
to get contacted.  
In Section 3, we saw that employed workers, on average, have a much 
higher probability to get contacted by an employer.  It is obvious from the 
results of the estimation that a large proportion of this difference reflects 
systematic differences between employed and unemployed applicants.  To get a 
                                                      
19 The “typical” searcher is a 26-35 year old Swedish man with secondary education and at least 
five years labor market experience who has a driving license, good computer skills, good 
language skills in Swedish and English and that searches for technical work (Amsyk 3) in 
Stockholm. 
20 It is quite easy to think of a low skilled older worker for whom a 3 percentage point reduction 
in the contact probability translates into a 15-20 percent relative difference between being 
employed and unemployed. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  21 
feeling for what these differences are, it is illuminating to consider columns 1 
to 3 in Table 4, where we start with only labor market status variables as 
regressors and then successively introduce other variables that might contain 
systematic differences between employed and unemployed applicants (the 
constant and the time variables are included in all regressions). 
In the first column, we regress the probability to get contacted by an 
employer only on the employment status variables.  An unemployed worker 
faces a 6.3 percentage points lower probability to get contacted than an 
employed worker.  In the second column, we include variables corresponding 
to such observable productive characteristics that are usually included in 
discrimination studies.  The probability difference now falls to 4.8 percent 
implying that some of the difference in search outcome between employed and 
unemployed applicants is explained by the fact that the unemployed applicants 
have less education and less labor market experience.  In the third column, we 
introduce the variables corresponding to the requirements applicants have on 
the jobs they hope to find.  We see that unemployed workers now face a 4.0 
percentage points lower probability to get contacted.  The difference between 
the results in columns 2 and 3 hence reflects the fact that unemployed 
applicants seem to search for the “wrong” kinds of jobs in the “wrong” regions.  
In column 4, all variables observed by the firms are included.  It should be 
noted that many of these variables are not normally available in studies of 
discrimination. 
An interesting question is if the disadvantage unemployed searchers seem to 
face differs between different subgroups of unemployed applicants.  We might 
for example ask whether unemployed women face a bigger disadvantage than 
unemployed men do.  To investigate this, we introduce an interaction term 
between the female and unemployed variables in specification (1).  This new 
variable turns out to be statistically insignificant and thus we conclude that 
firms consider unemployment as an equally strong negative signal for men and 
women.  A similar question is whether the negative effect of being unemployed 
differ among occupations.  Such an analysis can be done by adding interaction 
terms between occupational variables and the unemployed variable.  Doing this 
we find that the coefficient estimates are bigger for less skilled occupations, but 
that all these differences are statistically insignificant.  Thus, we draw the 
conclusion that no particular occupational group drives the results.
21 
                                                      
21 Similar results are obtained when we interact skill variables with the unemployment variable. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  22
An important issue for any empirical analysis is whether the results are 
sensitive to the choice of statistical model.  For the LPM model, we have tried 
a number of different specifications with very similar results.  To ensure that 
our results are not specific to the use of this particular model, we have also 
estimated the equivalent of equation (1) using the Probit model.
22  This yields 
very similar results; the marginal effect becomes equal to 0.033.  Thus, our 
results appear stable with respect to changes in model specification. 
To summarize the results so far, we can conclude that unemployed workers 
have a lower chance than employed workers to get contacted by an employer.  
Some of this difference is explained by the fact that unemployed workers have 
less education and less labor market experience and by differences in the type 
of job they wish to find.  However, even after we control for these variables a 
non-negligible negative effect remains from being unemployed, thus, indicating 
that unemployment per se is considered as a negative signal.  
 
4.3   The number of contacts received 
We also know the number of contacts our applicants have received during their 
time in the Applicant Database.  This means that we can take the analysis a bit 
further by asking: do unemployed workers get fewer contacts as well? 
We want to estimate a model for the number of contacts received by the 
searchers in the Applicant Database with the dependent variable being the 
number of contacts received.  We estimate the following specification with 
ordinary least squares: 
 
ε φ γ δ β φ α + + + + + + = T X Z S t Y ' ' ' ' ' ,                                                  (2) 
 
where Y  now denotes the number of contacts.  All the explanatory variables 
are defined as in specification (1).  The results of the estimation are presented 






                                                      
22 For a comparison of the LPM model with the Probit model see the discussion in Amemiya 
(1981). IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  23 
Table 5.  Ordinary least squares estimates of the number of contacts received 
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  0 ≥ Y   0 > Y  
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Good language skills – G-F-S 
 
Other signals (T): 
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Note: The first column includes all applicants, the second only those that have received at least 
one contact.  The reference category is an employed man with Swedish sounding name having 
primary education, some labor market experience and looking for unskilled work in Stockholm. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
In column 1, we have the results of the regression for the full sample.  We see 
that the results confirm what we saw in Table 4.  Unemployed job seekers face 
a significantly worse outcome than employed job seekers.  On average, an 
otherwise identical searcher gets contacted 0.13 times less if he is unemployed.  
As we did with the contact probability, we can calculate the effects for the IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  25 
“typical” searcher.  Such a searcher receives 1.10 contacts if he is employed 
and 0.97 contacts if he is unemployed.  Thus, the contact probability is reduced 
by around 12 percent. 
It is possible that applicants that do get at least one offer differ in some 
important way from those applicants that do not get any offers.  To see if this is 
true, we run a regression including only those applicants that have received at 
least one contact.  The results of that regression are presented in column 2.  We 
see that the difference is even bigger; an unemployed worker receives 
approximately 0.21 fewer contacts than an employed applicant.     
To see if the statistical model chosen affects the results, we have also esti-
mated the model using two models that are often proposed in the literature; the 
Poisson model and the Negative Binomial model (see the discussion in Greene 
(1997)).  Estimation of the equivalent of equation (2) for the whole sample, 
using both of these models, yields very similar estimates for the unemployment 
variable.  The result that unemployed workers receive fewer contacts than 
employed searchers, therefore, seems very stable over different model 
assumptions.  
To summarize, unemployed workers receive significantly fewer contacts 
than employed searchers.  The probability to get contacted is lower for an 
unemployed worker and, even if a person gets contacted, he gets fewer offers if 
he is unemployed. 
 
 
5 Concluding  remarks 
Firms hiring new workers are often not able to perfectly observe the productive 
abilities of their applicants.  Instead, employers try to infer the productivity of 
job seekers by using whatever information they have available.  Such informa-
tion often includes signals; i.e. factors that firms believe are correlated with 
unobservable factors that affect productivity.   One example of such a signal is 
the employment status of the applicant.  If employers use employment status as 
a hiring criterion, an unemployed job seeker should face a lower probability to 
get contacted by a firm than an employed job seeker.  The purpose of this paper 
has been to empirically investigate whether this theoretical implication is valid. 
Using Swedish data from the Applicant Database, we have seen that an 
unemployed job seeker faces a lower probability to get contacted by a firm, and 
receives fewer contacts, than an employed job seeker.  These effects remain IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  26
even after we control for a number of other factors that the firm can observe 
prior to its contact decision.  Thus, the results of the empirical analysis give 
support to the proposition that firms view employment status as an important 
signal for productivity and that firms therefore, ceteris paribus, prefer to 
contact employed applicants rather than unemployed applicants. 
The results in this study indicate that unemployed job seekers are at a dis-
advantage compared to employed job seekers in our sample from the Applicant 
Database.  An important issue is whether the same is true for the whole labor 
market.  Obviously, only further empirical analysis can answer such a question.  
However, a priori it is difficult to think of any particular reason why firms 
using the Applicant Database should be more prone to view unemployment as a 
negative worker characteristic than employers using other search channels. 
Another important issue that should be addressed is what the aggregate 
implications are of the effects we have identified.   From the analysis in 
Eriksson and Gottfries (2003), it is clear that in an economy where firms 
perceive unemployed applicants as less hirable than employed applicants there 
will be more wage pressure and higher unemployment.  At the very least our 
study indicates that such effects may be an important factor that affects the 
dynamics of unemployment. IFAU – Competition between employed and unemployed job applicants: Swedish evidence  27 
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Appendix 1: Comparison of the 
characteristics of the unemployed 
Table A1. Comparison of the characteristics of the unemployed in the 





Highest level of completed education:   
Primary 0.07  0.25 
Secondary 0.49  0.59 
University 0.44  0.16 
Work experience:    
None 0.15  0.12 
Some or long  0.85  0.88 
Age:    
Mean (years)  33.8  43.8 
Age 20-25  0.29  0.07 
Age 26-35  0.33  0.22 
Age 36-50  0.28  0.37 
Age 51-  0.10  0.34 
Gender:    
Female 0.49  0.50 
Ethnicity:    
Foreign name  0.13  0.19 
Note: The data from Händel is for the year 2000.  The variable “foreign name” in the Applicant 
Database is compared to the variable “being born in a country other than Sweden” in Händel.  
The work experience variable in Händel distinguishes only between having no experience and 
having experience. 
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